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Stephen G. Coughlan* Public Housing and Equality
Rights - Dartmouth/Halifax
County Regional Housing
Authority v. Irma Sparks
In Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks,'
courts in Nova Scotia are once again called upon to consider whether
tenants in public housing are entitled to the same protection as private
tenants. The Supreme Court Appeal Division decided in Bernard v.
Dartmouth Housing Authority2 that shorter notice periods for public
housing tenants were not objectionable, under either s. 7 or s. 15 of the
Charter. The issue will now return to the Court of Appeal, but in the
meantime the County Court has held that Bernard still sets the standard
in Nova Scotia.
Under theResidential Tenancies Act,3 tenants not in public housing are
guaranteed three. months notice to quit, and those who have resided in a
rental property for more than five years have security of tenure. However,
tenants in public housing do not enjoy these protections: they are entitled
only to the notice period in their lease, and do not enjoy security of tenure
- see s. 10(8)(d) and s. 25(2) of the Act. It is these latter sections that were
challenged in Sparks, as violating the equality provisions of the Charter.
At issue is whether those in public housing are a group protected by s.
15, and whether the different treatment is of the sort that attracts Charter
protection. In particular, the court is required to deal with the difficult
question of "adverse effect discrimination", rather than more
straightforward direct discrimination. The approach to be taken to these
two issues under s. 15 is not identical: unfortunately, that difference has
created some problems in the County Court decision.
There are positive features to the County Court decision. Judge
Palmeter accepted that the tenant -a black single mother receiving social
assistance -was covered by s. 15, not only on the enumerated grounds of
race and sex, but also on the ground that" 'social assistance recipients' are
an 'analogous group' protectedby s. 15 of the Charter".4 He also accepted
*Stephen G. Coughlan, LL.B., Ph.D., Assistant Director, Health Law Institute, Dalhousie
University.
1. (1992), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (Cty. Ct.), (hereafter Sparks).
2. (1988), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190.
3. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 401
4. Sparks, p. 394.
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that single-parent mothers have a more difficult time economically and
in finding appropriate housing,5 and that "one can almost take judicial
notice that the Black Community in Nova Scotia has always been at the
low end of the economic scale".6
However, despite these findings, Palmeter J. finds that there is no
violation of s. 15. In particular,he holds that the lesser protection forthose
in public housing is not an instance of adverse effect discrimination.
There is cause to be less than satisfied with the reasoning behind this
conclusion. First, the test Palmeter J. adopts to determine whether
adverse effect discrimination exists is not consistent with Supreme Court
of Canada decisions on the issue. Further, even accepting the test as
Palmeter J. formulates it, it is not clear why that test is not met in this case.
I. The Test for Adverse Effect Discrimination
The test for adverse effect discrimination is found in Re Ontario Human
Rights Commission and Simpson-Sears Ltd. (normally referred to as
O'Malley):
It arises when an employer for genuine business reasons adopts a rule or
standard which is on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to all
employees, but which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground
on one employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some
special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or
restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force.
7
PalmeterJ. focuses, inhis decision, on the statementthatthe discrimination
must result "because of some special characteristic of the employee or
group". He denies that that portion of the test is met in this case.
He holds that "there has to be a connection between the characteristic
of the sex, or the race, or the source of income, and the different treatment
for a charge of discrimination to be even considered".8 But, he says:
it is not a characteristic of being black that one resides in public housing.
Similarly, it is not a characteristic of being a single mother or a female that
one resides in public housing. In my opinion, it is not a characteristic of
having a low income that one resides in public housing9
It was an agreed fact in the case that "women, blacks and social assistance
recipients form a disproportionately large number of tenants in public
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) at 332, per McIntyre J.
8. Sparks, p. 401.
9. Ibid.
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housing".'0 Accordingly, Palmeter J. presumably does not simply mean
that residing in public housing is not in fact a characteristic of these
groups. Rather, it seems he must have in mind that residing in public
housing is not necessarily a characteristic of these groups.
In O'Malley, for example, one might take it to be fundamental to
Seventh Day Adventists that they not work on Saturdays - if one were
willing to do so, one could not be a Seventh Day Adventist. Accordingly,
"special characteristic" in the O'Malley test might refer to a characteristic
necessarily possessed by an individual or group: that is how Palmeter J.
interprets the test.
However, the O'Malley test can be interpreted in at least two ways,
either of which would be consistent with the actual result. By "special
characteristic", McIntyre J. may have meant a characteristic that is
necessarily possessed by the individual or group. Alternatively, he may
only have meant a characteristic that is infact possessed by the individual
or group.
To determine the correct interpretation, one must not look at this single
phrase in isolation, but rather in the context of the decision as a whole, and
in light of other decisions. Elsewhere in O'Malley, McIntyre says "It is
the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If
it does, in fact, cause discrimination...it is discriminatory" [emphasis
added]. I This statement has been further adopted by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Action Travail Des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway
Co.' 2 and in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia." All of this
suggests that a necessary connection is not required.
Further evidence of the problem with the approach in this case is found
in its inconsistency with other decisions. Under this interpretation, the
American case of Duke Power'4- the very case from which the Supreme
Court of Canada adopted the concept of adverse effect discrimination -
would not meet the test. It was not necessarily true that blacks would be
less likely to have a high school diploma, but nonetheless because that
requirement acted to exclude more blacks, it was struck down. Similarly,
in Action Travail,'5 it was not-necessarily true that supervisors at CN
would have a low opinion of women: it was only in fact true.
Most importantly, Palmeter J.'s formulation of the test does not take
into account the special nature of adverse effect discrimination. He insists
10. Ibid., p. 393.
11. Supra, note 7, p. 329.
12. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.)
13. (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
14. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
15. Supra, note 12.
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that the claim must fail unless the government has singled out a
characteristic of being black, female, or on social assistance in the
legislation.16 But if the government had singled out, in the statute,
something necessarily a characteristic of being black, female, oron social
assistance, that would be direct discrimination, not adverse effect
discrimination. To say "people with dark skin are only entitled to one
month's notice" is to discriminate directly. It is only when an apparently
neutral rule - i.e., one that does not single out a necessary characteristic
of some group - is discovered to have an adverse effect that one speaks
of adverse effect discrimination.
Accordingly, although Palmeter J.'s test is consistent with the precise
quote from O'Malley, it is not consistent with other statements in that
case, with a liberal interpretation of the Charter,17 or with other cases. The
very nature of adverse effect discrimination requires a broader reading.
II. The Limited Test Proposed in the Case is Met
Even granting Palmeter J.'s test, however, it seems that one should find
a s. 15 violation in this case.
Palmeter J. denies that it is a characteristic of blacks, women, or those
on social assistance to live in public housing. It may be that living in
public housing is not necessarily a characteristic of blacks and women -
one can imagine a world in which it were not true. But it is hard to see why
there is not a necessary connection between living in public housing and
receiving social assistance. Both are social measures undertaken by the
government to assist low income groups.
The Bernard decision, for example, says that "the public housing
scheme is clearly designed for the relief of poverty" - that is, those in
public housing are poor. Social assistance legislation has the same goal
- those on social assistance are poor. It is difficult to imagine someone
asserting that being poor is not a characteristic of those who are poor, and
yet that is what this decision amounts to saying.
The decision's answer to this, it seems, is that although it is a
characteristic of those in public housing to be black, female, and poor, the
reverse does not hold:
16. Sparks, note 4, p. 402.
17. Note specifically the warning in O'Malley against restricting oneself to "the narrowest
interpretation of the words employed" (supra, note 7, pp. 328-329).
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the fact that public housing tenants are disproportionately black, females
on social assistance tells us something about public housing but doesn't
tell us anything about being black, about being female or [about] being on
social assistance.18
This conclusion seems mistaken. First, if it is true that (to simplify
matters) public housing tenants are disproportionately black, then it is
equally true that blacks are disproportionately public housing tenants -
that is what is meantby "disproportionately", that the correlation between
the two is higher than expected. If the first statement tells us something
about public housing, the second ought to tell us something about being
black.
It may be that Palmeter J. has in mind a question of numbers: if you
look-at public housing tenants, you find that most are black, female, and/
or poor, but if you look at those who are black, female, and/or poor, you
don'tfind thatmost are public housingtenants. If this is therationale, then
it is mistaken. First, "disproportion" does not require a majority. More to
the point, it assumes - falsely - that there is sufficient public housing.
Palmeter J. acknowledges the waiting list for public housing. 9 The better
comparison would be the percentage of blacks, females, or poor people
who want to be in public housing, rather than those who in fact are.
Second, this approach assumes that it matters whether we characterize
the facts as being about public housing, or as being about black single
mothers. But in Action Travail, the problem was that women were held
in low esteem by CN supervisors. It would be an idiosyncratic use of
language to describe this situation by saying that it is a characteristic of
women to be held in low esteem by CN supervisors: nonetheless, that
conclusion can be drawn, since the situation meets the adverse effect
discrimination test. By the same token, if the form of words is really all
that important, it seems we can say that living in public housing is a
characteristic of black single mothers.
But most importantly, this decision does not take into account the
difference between individuals and groups, which again is part of the
difference between direct and adverse effect discrimination.
Thejudgement seems to say that something can only be a characteristic
of blacks, women or social assistance recipients if it is true of (virtually)
all of them. It is a characteristic of women to have female sexual organs.
It is a characteristic of blacks to have relatively darker skin. It is a
characteristic of social assistance recipients to have a low income. Take
18. Sparks, p. 402.
19. Sparks, p. 396.
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any individual women, black, or social assistance recipient, and this
characteristic will (almost certainly) be true of them. But the characteristic
"lives in public housing" may not be true of that individual, and so it is
not a characteristic.
This approach ignores the difference between being a characteristic of
an individual and of a group. It is not true of each individual woman that
she cannot get promoted, but it is true of women that they are typically in
lower level jobs: being less likely to hold aseniorposition is a characteristic
of women. Not every black is under-educated, but it is a characteristic of
blacks as a group to be less likely to have attended university. In this
sense, "lives in public housing" is a characteristic of black single mothers.
Put another way, the question is not whether "lives in public housing"
is a characteristic of women, blacks, or the poor: it is whether "is more
likely to live in public housing" is a characteristic of the members of those
groups. But that question just amounts to asking whether that group is
disproportionately represented. In this case, all parties agree that blacks,
women, and social assistance recipients are in fact disproportionately
represented in public housing: further, being more likely to live in public
housing seems necessarily a characteristic of those on social assistance,
since they are the very people for whom it was designed." It appears
therefore that the test, even as Palmeter J. formulates it, is met.
Em. A Questionable Assumption of Fact
One final issue is worth noting, again related to whether discrimination
has been shown on the facts of this case.
Palmeter J. notes from Andrews that:
Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge
of discrimination while those based on individuals' merits and capacities
will rarely be so classified.2'
This distinction is a sensible one (though it does not really relate to
adverse effect discrimination cases). What is disturbing in Sparks is the
use of this distinction: "Counsel for the Landlord submits that what we
are dealing with in this case is an individual's merits and capacities and
not an individual's personal characteristics. With that submission I am in
20. Indeed, in one sense it is difficult to speak of social assistance recipients being
"disproportionately" represented in public housing. "Disproportion" implies that there are
more of a particular group than one expects - but one expects public housing to be occupied
by people with low incomes.
21. Sparks, p. 400, citing p. 18 of Andrews, supra, note 13.
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agreement"; and "the distinction is not based on the Tenant's personal
characteristics but rather on her merits and capacities". 2
Applied directly to the facts of this case, these statements seem to say
that women and blacks are disproportionately represented in public
housing because of their own merits and capacities. At the very least, they
say that Irma Sparks is in public housing due to her own inability to
manage anything better.
It is, perhaps, possible that women and blacks generally earn lower
incomes simply because, judged objectively, they are less capable.
However, one would like to see some very persuasive evidence before
adopting such a view - and certainly before relying on it as ajustification
for limiting equality rights. These two isolated comments should not be
blown out of proportion: neither is pursued at any length, and the decision
does not hinge on them. Nonetheless, it is both disappointing and
disturbing to see that assumption apparently reflected in this decision.
IV Conclusion
The equality rights provision in the Charter has proven to be difficult, as
courts have had to sort their way through differences that are not
discriminatory, and equal treatment that promotes inequality. Adverse
effect discrimination in particular is a difficult concept, requiring different
considerations from direct discrimination. The central issue in this case
is whether the difference in treatment between public and private tenants
is objectionable. But due to confusion between direct and adverse effect
discrimination, and the ambiguity of the test proposed, this decision never
really comes to grips with that issue.
22. Sparks, p. 401 and p. 402.
